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We study the effect on loan conditions for Belgian small firms of the geographical distance between
firms, the lending bank, and att other banks in the vicinity: We find that, in line with predictions
emanating from theory modeling spatial price discrimination, borrowing costs decrease in the dis-
tance between the firm and the lending bank. We identify banking competition and pricing strategies
in our analysis by including competition measures and the distance between the borrower and com-
peting bank branches in the vicinity. We observe that increasing distance between the borrower and
alternative lenders significantly relaxes price competition and results in substantially higher borrow-
ing costs for the firm. We further document that the distance between the Belgian firms and the bank







We study the effect on loan conditions of
the geographical distance between firms,
the lending bank, and all other banks in the
vicinity, controlling for relevant relation-
ship, loan, bank branch, firm, and regional
characteristics. For our study, we employ a
unique data set containing detailed loan
contract information (including firm and
lender identities and addresses) from more
than 15,000 bank loans to (predomi-
nantly) Belgian small firms as well as infor-
mation on competing bank branches in the
vicinity of the firm.
We find that, in line with predictions
emanating from theory modeling spatial
price discrimination, borrowing costs
decrease in the distance between the firm
and the lending bank. We identify banking
competition and pricing strategies in our
analysis by including competition meas-
ures and the distance between the
borrower and competing bank branches in
the vicinity. We observe that increasing
distance between the borrower and alter-
native lenders significantly relaxes price
competition and results in substantially
higher borrowing costs for the firm. We
further document that the distance
between the Belgian firms and the bank in
our study did not increase substantially
over the period 1975-1997'.
II. Data and Event Study
Methodology
Loan Contracts
We extend a data set detailed in Degrysc
and Van Cayseele (1998) and employed by
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000). The
original data set consists of 17,776 loans
given to independents (or single-person
businesses), and small, medium, and large-
sized firms by an important Belgian bank
which operates all over Belgium. Around
80% of the firms are single-person busi-
nesses (sole proprietorships). Some
borrowers take several loans from this
bank; the data set covers loans granted to
13,104 borrowers - implying that the
average borrower maintained 1.36 loans
at that bank. The sample commences with
all existing loans at the bank as of
August 10, 1997 that were initiated after
January 1st, 1995.
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For each borrower we calculate the distance to both the
lending bank and the branches of all other, competing
banks located in the same postal zone as the borrower. As
of December 31st, 1994, we identify 7,477 branches,
operated by 145 different banks and located in 837
different postal zones. Each postal zone covers on average
25 sq. km, and contains approximately nine bank
branches. Not surprisingly borrowers are often located in
more densely banked areas, with on average more than 17
bank branches per postal zone, resulting in around
250,000 possible borrowers - bank branch pairs.
We employ both web-based MapBlast.com and PC-based
MS Mappoint to track the shortest traveling time (in
minutes) by car between the borrower and each bank
branch. We choose the shortest traveling time, the default
setting in both programs, over a number of other mapping
alternatives. We provide concrete statistics on this issue
when we discuss the results. Address recording errors,
incomplete map coverage, and changes in street names
(we have 1995 addresses but the software is using up-to-
date maps) cut in our sample. Table 1 provides summary
statistics for the remaining 15,044 contracts. It shows the
definition, mean, median, minimum, maximum, and
standard deviation of selected variables.
Distance to Lender
The median borrower is located around 4 minutes and
20 seconds from the lender, which depending on the local
'4
rcjad conditions translates into 2.25 kilometers
(1.40 miles) of driving at 31 km/h (20 mph). In contrast,
Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that the median distance
between lending banks and small US firms covered by the
1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF)
is more than double, i.e. 4 miles. However, the median
firm in the NSSBF employs 2 to 4 employees, while the
median firm in our sample is a sole proprietorship. In
addition, costs of driving may differ substantially between
Belgium and the U.S., and Belgian businesses may be
limited by the size of the country in their choice of domes-
tically located banks. These arguments may also explain
the even larger differences with the other distance statis-
tics Petersen and Rajan (2002) report. For example, the
average (75 percentile) borrower - bank distance in our
sample is around 3 (3.5) miles, while the same borrower
in Petersen and Rajan (2002) communicates across 42.5
(14) miles with her bank, or across a whopping 252 (255)
miles with her other financial institutions.
Petersen and Rajan (2002) also report that the distance
between U.S. borrowers and banks has increased dramat-
ically over time. For example, the median bank-borrower
distance has more than doubled between the mid-70s and
the early-90s from 2 to 5 miles, while the average distance
more than quadrupled from 16 to 68 miles. In contrast, in
our sample, the median and average distances between the
borrowers and the Belgian bank we study increased by
only around 30%, from 4 (6.85) in 1975 to 5.2 (8.86)
minutes in 1997.
Most of the modest increase in traveling time in our
sample seems to occur during the early-90s. This increase
may be partly driven by the changes in the number of
bank branches because of regulatory driven de-specializa-
tion of financial intermediation and resulting consolida-
tion.
Distance to Closest Competitor
We now turn to our other main variable of interest,
distance to the closest competitors. The median (average)
borrower in our sample is 3 minutes and 15 (50) seconds
from the quartile closest competitor located in the same
postal zone. The quartile closest competitor is the bank
branch with the 25-percentile traveling time located in the
same postal zone as the borrower. We select this measure
as our metric of competitor proximity for obvious meas-
urement reasons. In addition, bank branches may not be
entirely homogeneous in their product offerings. In that
case, we also conjecture our 25% measure to be more
highly correlated with the distance to the closest, 'truly'
competing bank branch than the minimum distance
metric.
The lending bank is located closer than the quartile
(closest) competitor in more than 44% (25%) of the
borrower contract cases making distance a relevant bank
(product) characteristic for a sizeable minority of the
borrowers in our data set. A majority of the borrowers
though doesn't seem overly constrained by geographical
proximity. Hence, our statistics suggest that, while
distance is important, information, reputation, and other
bank characteristics may also determine the choice of
lender and the resulting loan conditions.
Other Variables
The rest of the variables are also discussed at length in
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and in our working
paper, so we abridge the write-up here. We include rela-
tionship characteristics, competition variables, interest
rate variables, and firm characteristics. The loan contract
characteristic we want to explain is the Interest Rate on
the loan until the next revision. The average interest rate
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on a loan in our sample is 8.12% or 812 basis points (we
will employ basis points throughout the paper to facilitate
the tabulation and interpretation of the results). Other
loan characteristics are whether or not the loan is collat-
eralized, the repayment duration of the loan, and
dummies capturing the type of loan the firm is taking.
III. Empirical Results
Regression Analysis
This section provides the empirical results of the determi-
nants of the loan rate (see Table 2). We analyze the deter-
minants of the loan rate by regressing the loan interest
rate on our distance, relationship, competition, and
control variables (which include loan contract character-
istics, firm characteristics, and interest rates). We use the
ordinary least squares estimation technique. We focus on
the distance variables. The other coefficients remain virtu-
ally unaltered, both as a departure from Degryse and Van
Cayseele (2000); hence we therefore neither discuss, nor
tabulate the estimated coefficients in this version of our
working paper.
Distance
We take the log of both disunce measures, ln(Distance to
Closest Competitors) and ln(Distance to Lender), as we
conjecture the marginal impact on the loan rate to
decrease (in absolute value) in distance. The positive and
significant coefficients on ln(Distance to Closest Compet-
itors) in Models 1 and II suggest that borrowers located
farther away from competing bank branches face a higher
loan rate at the lending bank. These results are consistent
with price discrimination resulting from transportation
costs, monitoring costs, as well as asymmetric informa-
tion. Moreover our proxy for the distance between the
borrower and the closest competitor may identify stra-
tegic behavior between banks, which our other competi-
tion variables did not (or only partly) pick up. Indeed,
even after controlling for the number of competitors,
branch concentration, postal zone and bank branch
effects, the lending bank seems to enjoy substantial
market power that increases in the distance to the closest
competitors. In addition, this market power decreases in
the distance between the borrower and the lender itself, as
indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on the
variable ln(Distance to Lender).
Both distance effects are not only statistically but also
economically relevant. Using the estimates of Model II,
for example, an increase of one standard deviation in the
distance between borrower and lender, i.e.t the traveling
time increasing from 0 to 7.3 minutes, decreases the loan
rate by 12 basis points. An increase of one standard devi-
ation in the distance between borrower and the closest
competitors (from 0 to 2.3 minutes) increases the loan
rate by about 20 basis points.
IV. Conclusion
We directly study the effect on loan conditions of the
geographical distance between firms, the lending bank,-
1
and all other banks in the vicinity of the firm. We report,
as far as we are aware, the first comprehensive evidence of
the occurrence of spatial pricing in bank lending. Loan,
rates decrease in the distance between the firm and tne
lender and increase similarly in the distance between the
firm and competing banks. Both effects are statistically
significant and economically relevant. The results seem
not induced by the modest changes in lending technology
we infer. The observed stability of the Belgian bank
branch system during our sample period allows us to
interpret the coefficients of the simple reduced form spec-
ifications within the framework of static models
explaining spatial price discrimination.
If banks persist in pricing loans by location, brick-and-
mortar branching may remain vital in ensuring access to
credit at reasonable rates, in particular for small firms and
entrepreneurs. While technological developments in
communication and travel may ultimately diminish the
relevance of distance, we find only minor traces of such
developments in our sample (which envelops the 1975-
1997 period). The latter result suggests that presaging 'the
Death of Distance* remains somewhat premature in a
European banking context.
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Variables Definition Mean Med. Win Max St.dev.
Distance
Distance to Lender Shortest traveling time, In minutes 6.90 «*S' 8.00 51.00 T^B
Distance to Closes! Competitors Shortest traveling Bme to me closest quartHe competitor in the 3.83 427 0.00 24.00 !&>
borrower's postal zone, in minutes
Loan Rate
Loan Rale Interest rate on loan until next revision, in basis points 612 782 200 2500 jM
Table 2: Borrowing Coats and the Role of Distance
Independent Variables I II
-4 -3" -6.4"
(2.S) (2.5)
ln(Distance to Closest Competitors) 16.1*" 16.6"*
(3X1 (3.6)
Relationship characteristics, Competition. Loan Contract* and Finn Cnaracteristics
D, Interest Rate Yes Yes
Variables
0, and Intercept , .
_______ Adjusted R
2 03XJ 0.223
NofaB. The dependent vanable is the Loan Rale untd next leviflion. in basis points. The number of observations is 15,044. We employ ordinary lean
squares estimation, '.".and — = snjri*csnlat10%.5%and1%l9''8l. (wo-IMed. Ir*.) aw the niUuraf tog of one Wis Ihe respective vanaWes. I
* (our loan reviaatHMy dummias, " atom posW area and 49 industry dummies, " two year BummteS-
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